Computing is being transformed to a model consisting of services that are commoditised and delivered in a manner similar to utilities such as water, electricity, gas, and telephony. In such a model, users access services based on their requirements without regard to where the services are hosted. Several computing paradigms have promised to deliver this utility computing vision. Cloud computing is the most recent emerging paradigm promising to turn the vision of "computing utilities" into a reality. Cloud computing has emerged as one of the buzzwords in the IT industry. Several IT vendors are promising to offer storage, computation and application hosting services, and provide coverage in several continents, offering Service-Level Agreements (SLA) backed performance and uptime promises for their services. It delivers infrastructure, platform, and software (application) as services, which are made available as subscription-based services in a pay-as-you-go model to consumers. The price that Cloud Service Providers charge can vary with time and the quality of service (QoS) expectations of consumers. This seminar/keynote talk will cover (a) 21st century vision of computing and identifies various IT paradigms promising to deliver the vision of computing utilities; (b) the architecture for creating market-oriented Clouds by leveraging technologies such as VMs; (c) market-based resource management strategies that encompass both customer-driven service management and computational risk management to sustain SLA-oriented resource allocation; (d) Aneka, a software system for rapid development of Cloud applications and their deployment on private/public Clouds with resource provisioning driven by SLAs and user QoS requirements, (e) experimental results on deploying Cloud applications in engineering, gaming, and health care domains (integrating sensors networks, mobile devices), ISRO satellite image processing on elastic Clouds, and (f) need for convergence of competing IT paradigms for delivering our 21st century vision along with pathways for future research.

Cyber weapons pose unprecedented challenges for international security. The speed and range of the new technology eliminate traditional limitations of geography in the infliction of harm. Ease of proliferation empowers nontraditional and dissatisfied actors. Escalatory ambiguity elevates the risks of accelerating crises even among rational contenders. Some attributes of the cyber danger fit into familiar concepts of force and conflict. Others threaten to upset our postulates. This seminar will assess the implications of the current cyber revolution for international security both as a field of scholarship and as a realm of policy.

Cyber Security is a broad term, often used to re-badge existing topics. However, there is no doubt that the world in which we live presents a new risk environment for large organisations. This talk will examine what Cyber Security means in practice for a large global organisation, and identify how traditional approaches to risk management need to change in today's dynamic and interconnected world.

With the growing realisation that current Internet protocols are reaching the limits of their senescence, a number of on-going research efforts aim to design potential next-generation Internet architectures. Although they vary in maturity and scope, in order to avoid past pitfalls, these efforts seek to treat security and privacy as key initial requirements. The Named Data Networking (NDN) is an Internet architecture that avoids IP's host-based, point-to-point networking approach in order to better accommodate new and emerging patterns of communication. NDN treats data as a first class object, explicitly naming it instead of its location. While the current Internet secures the "pipe" that carries data between hosts, NDN secures data – a design choice that decouples trust in data from trust in hosts, enabling scalable communication mechanisms, such as automatic caching of data in routers to optimize bandwidth. The NDN project poses numerous technical challenges that must be addressed to validate it as a future Internet architecture: routing scalability, fast forwarding, trust models, network security, content protection and privacy, and fundamental communication theory. This talk will overview NDN and then turn to security and privacy issues. By stressing content dissemination, NDN is an attractive and viable approach to many types of current and emerging communication models. It also incorporates some useful security and privacy features. We will first consider communication privacy and anonymity in NDN and describe an NDN add-on (called ANDANA) that offers the functionality similar to TOR on today's Internet. Since resilience to Denial of Service (DoS) attacks that plague today’s Internet is a major issue for any new architecture, we will discuss some initial research towards assessment and mitigation of DoS in NDN. Next, we will consider privacy implications of router-side content caching. Finally, we will discuss how to adapt NDN and its security features to environments other than content distribution, using the example of building automation.

Instruments of code-borne attack span a wide spectrum, from generic but low-potential tools to specific but high-potential weaponised software. Maximising the destructive potential of such tools is likely to come with a double effect: it will significantly increase the resources, intelligence, and time required for development and deployment – and more destructive potential is likely to decrease the number of targets, the risk of collateral damage, and the political utility of weaponised computer code. Do these assumptions hold up? If yes, what are the implications?

Online insecurity is like a Hydra with many heads - from e-commerce and online banking scams to malware; from hacking to cyberwar. It requires Herculean efforts to slay the Hydra, but, unfortunately, fighting insecurity may easily cause serious ethical problems, since security measures can also undermine individual liberties such as privacy, freedom of speech and expression. For such measures often rest on the collection, storage, access, or elaboration of individuals’ personal information. Clearly, any democratic government, fair society, and responsible organisation need to identify a balance between online security and civil rights, in order to implement the former successfully while respecting andfurthering the latter. The paper discusses a criterion for such a balance to be ethically sound. It is claimed that cyber security measures and individual rights are not necessarily antithetical, and that they should both be considered fundamental aspects of individual’s well-being in the information age.

Since the advent of the Internet, scholars have questioned whether individuals are the same online as they are in the physical world. Some have speculated that individuals can escape their offline selves and be very different people online; however, there is little rigorous research to test these claims. Moreover, research does not typically compare different online spaces. This paper will present preliminary findings from a series of studies which compare overall self with online selves (Facebook, twitter, online dating, LinkedIn). Given that the self has been operationalized in different ways by psychologists this paper considers this paper measures the self in two different ways: how individuals described themselves as well as via psychometric tests used to operationalise personality (e.g., openness, consciousness, extraversion, agreeableness and neuroticism). Some interesting results emerge when we compare selves across these spaces. The differences might be, in part, attributed to individuals’ need to impression manage as well as the architecture of the sites. It is concluded here that the Internet affords different opportunities to present different aspects of identity.

Organisations try to traditionally manage information security risks through security policies. Some policies can be enforced through technical mechanisms, but organisations also rely on staff behaving in a certain way, and many threaten employees with sanctions in case of non-compliance. In recent years, we have collected many examples of non-compliance, and reasons for them through interviews with hundreds of employees, and surveys with thousands.  We found that the most common cause of non-compliant behaviour is actual experience, or fear of, reduced productivity - and that organisations are often complicit in this behaviour. In this talk, I will present a set of non-compliant  behaviours with authentication and access control, and outline changes in technology and organisational design that can be made to foster compliance. 'Security awareness' is often touted as the solution, but there is plenty of empirical evidence that it does not work in isolation. I will argue that risk communication needs to be combined with low effort security technology, engagement and increased autonomy to achieve lasting behaviour change.

Industrial Control and SCADA Systems interact with the physical world. Disruption to these systems - whether malicious or not - can impact human well-being in addition to having financial consequences. Previously considered too esoteric for attack, the world is now becoming aware that these systems have vulnerabilities that may allow attackers to issue malicious commands. But just how do you secure a 10 year old system that cannot be switched off, not even for a reboot?