In the age of Web 2.0, cloud computing and big data, an increasing amount of personal data are processed and users often have no or little insight or control over what happens with their  personal data. This presentation will first briefly discuss emerging  privacy issues and will then present how usable privacy-preserving  transparency-enhancing tools can provide users with better control over their personal spheres.

I will look at the history of propaganda and how this is changing and being used by governments and corporations to change views and get intelligence on different parts of society in different parts of the world. How social media changed the Arab Spring and the way people like Edward Snowden have changed people's views of Intelligence.

The Information Age has dawned.  The singularity approaches; the children of Colossus are approaching adolescence.  Humanity is now compelled to contemplate the inevitability of a transformation in the nature of its condition and of its affairs of at least equal magnitude to the sum of the Neolithic Revolution, the Reformation, the Enlightenment and the Industrial Revolution.  At the heart of this is the phenomenon to which we have given the uneasy name of Cyber.  At the heart of the Cyber phenomenon sits the Internet.  We apprehend that Cyber is greater than merely the Internet under another name, at the same time as we confess to the admission that we comprehend neither.  Society, and with it humanity, is now utterly dependant upon the Internet and upon the Cyber domain.  This dependence is irreversible.  Robots and micro fabrication alone will ensure that the Cyber domain continues its inexorable disruption of every facet of society.  We are confronted with a reality that we created; that we do not understand; that is changing us beyond recognition.  And we are afraid.  The Cyber domain is the new evolutionary context for humanity.  It's existence is external to us and will become in independent of us.  Whatever this new construct is, we will fail utterly to understand it if we restrict our sense making activity to the previously dominant academic disciplines of science and mathematics.  It is not possible to simply STEM the tide of this ignorance.  In order to begin the process of understanding our new context we must build a new conceptual approach.  One that relinquishes the artificial division of the human sense making activity in to academic disciplines.  One that seeks to arrive at an understanding of the nature and origins of the Cyber domain in space, time, mind and matter.  To do this we must first attempt a new multi disciplinary synthesis in our study of the the current form of the Cyber domain.  This talk is an exposition of work in progress to construct a candidate narrative of the history of the Cyber domain.  This work seeks to illustrate how we might better set about the task of enhancing the human experience of the Cyber domain if we deploy the disciplines of history, philosophy, sociology and narrative analysis at the fore of our endeavours.  This talk will draw out a number of areas where current practice could be significantly improved by so doing.  We must seek to understand this new context as a necessary precondition of our ability to adapt to it.  To understand this new context we need new tools of the mind.   

Many protocols use the Diffie-Hellman method for key agreement, in combination with certified long-term values or digital signatures for authentication.  These protocols are intended to satisfy security goals such as key secrecy, forward secrecy, resistance to key compromise attacks and unknown key share attacks, and various flavors of authentication.  We express these security goals by formulas in a first-order language, which take a special form, namely as geometric sequents. We prove it is decidable whether a protocol in a fairly inclusive class of DH protocols ("lightweight" protocols) achieves a given security goal. Protocol executions form logical models (structures), and a counterexample to a security goal is a model in which the desired security goal is not satisfied.  Each model includes a cyclic group of a particular prime order q and a field of the same characteristic q, as is standard. An adversary strategy succeeds if for infinitely many q, there are counter-models based on prime q, using this strategy. While apparently weaker than the full computational attacker, this adversary strengthens earlier work within algebraic or symbolic models.  Our decidability result depends on working directly within the natural algebraic structures (cyclic groups and fields), rather than within the equational theories that symbolic models have previously used.

Given the internet doubtless contains a wealthof material that meets intelligence requirements imposed by elected governments, what should the intelligence agencies do? Should they not seek to conduct operations to find information there on the basis that to do so cannot be proportionate to the privacy invasion that follows? Is the internet "different"? If so, how and why, and does that difference justify a self-denying ordinance in terms of what is sought and how it is sought? What should that be? Should intelligence agencies not seek to do anything other than pursue known targets? Do revised laws offer a solution? Does technology offer a solution? All these are questions brought to the fore in recent disclosures by Edward Snowden: but they cannot be new questions for the intelligence agencies even if the disclosures have forced the questions on a wider audience. What has been the position? Why has it been thought to be legally and morally defensible in terms of a Government's duties to its citizens? And what does the future hold? The analysis will seek to answer these questions.

 This informal talk will address a number of aspects, including: * Parliamentary Oversight over Cyber Security * Ways to provide better cyber security for home users and SMMEs * The risk of home users for CIIP * Cyber Security Capacity Building

BYOD seemed to emerge around 2009 as a questionable solution to rising IT costs, offering more functional and appealing technology choices, but what risks come with it? Was it initiated by companies or user community? How widespread and inevitable is BYOD? Phil Cracknell takes a look at the current situation, highlights a few recent trends, and suggests a way to survive BYOD.

Over the last two years, the United Nations' Office on Drugs and Crime has been conducting a study on preventing and combating cybercrime, using extensive interviews and detailed questionnaires completed by 69 states and a number of non-governmental organisations. Dr Brown was part of the team producing the final report, which was published in February 2013. In this talk he'll describe the key findings, which cover: The impact of fragmentation at international level and diversity of national cybercrime laws on international co-operation; Formal international co-operation in criminal matters involving cybercrime and electronic evidence for all crimes; The role of evidence 'location'; Harmonisation of national legal frameworks; Law enforcement and criminal justice capacity; Cybercrime prevention activities.

Aggressive intelligence acquisition has been one of the main strategies employed by the United States in its fight against terrorism following the attacks on 9/11. Whistleblowers and court records reveal that the US government uses telecommunications and internet intelligence to identify targets for drones, pursue court cases against captured terrorist suspects and intervene in plots before they unfold. This surveillance strategy was not invented in the days following 9/11. Rather it is the natural outgrowth of a line of technological policy stretching back to the end of the Cold War and implemented by some of the same men involved in its original creation. Using archival records, this research connects the origin of US telecommunications and information policy at the end of the Cold War to the intelligence strategy employed against global terror networks. It also shows how cooperation between telecommunications companies and the intelligence community developed during the Cold War only to be reinforced by the war on terror. It also notes how the government has attempted to stay abreast of current technology in a rapidly changing environment. Finally, it questions the wisdom of employing historical information security strategies for dealing with a superpower to their reapplication to a new medium, a new enemy, and a new historical mome.

In this talk I try to explain the importance of cyber capabilities and effects to the military and to draw the distinction with cyber-warfare as often characterised by the media. The distinction raises the question of the role of the military in National Cyber Security, and the increasing requirement for non-traditional capabilities – and the need for a co-ordinated multi-department approach to national security.